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ABSTRACT 
POLITICS OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM: 
A POST-COLONIAL AND POST-SOCIALIST SCHEMA 
This paper aims to propose a schema for analyzing the contemporary politics of 
national and ethnic identity in post-colonial and post-socialist states. To this end, it will 
seek: a. to provide a comprehensive operational definition of nationalism, b. to qualify 
that definition by adding the adjective “ethnic”, c. to assess the extent to which the 
concept “ethnic nationalism” can help us understand some of the politics of ethnicity 
and national identity in a post-independence setting, and d. to problematize the notion 
of  “false  consciousness”  in  ethno-national  political  appeals.  My  argument  will  be 
situated within the broad theoretical framework of a non-reductionist, neo-Marxist 
class analysis, for it is my conviction that ethno-national consciousness and politics are 
better understood if we are able to trace the concrete class interests and motives of their 
promoters. In other words, whether as sentiment or as movement, nationalism cannot 
be divorced from the class interests of its leading promoters. But one must be cautious 
when absolutizing the class claim, for in the specific case of ethnic nationalism, for 
example, Robin Williams has noted that “to dismiss ethnicity as false consciousness 
ignores the clear evidence that ethnies often sacrifice economic interests in favor of 
symbolic gains” (1994: 64–65), and even beyond this, as Ronaldo Munck reminds us, 
“nationalism matters because people die for it” (1986: 2). 
 
Key words: national and ethnic identity, ethnic nationalism, neo-Marxist class 
analysis, ethno-national consciousness 
INTRODUCTION: RELIGION AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 
In a world that is increasingly ravaged by religious and sectarian violence tied 
to ethnic self-determination, the region of Central Asia stands out as particularly 
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typical  of  a  post-colonial,  post-independence  one.  Tajikistan,  Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are all parts of Central Asia, which, 
throughout its early history, was heavily influenced by Islamic and Christian cultures. 
Today, however, the ethno-religious composition is mainly Muslim and Russian 
Orthodox as Kazaks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Kirghizes, Tajiks and Turkmen try to forge 
sovereign nations out of the mess left by the former Soviet Union.   
The major tensions in these countries revolve around the fact that since their 
independence the standard of living of the people has fallen sharply. However, as 
Qian Zongqi (2006) has noted, the biggest threat to the social order is not to be found 
in the increasing spread of poverty but rather in the growing religious extremism of 
various groups. The leaders of those groups responded to the deterioration in living 
standards  by  attempting  to  mobilize  their  followers  against  the  governments  in 
power via ethno-religious appeals. At the same time the governments in question 
sought to secularize their societies and to separate religious teachings from political 
and state practices. However, the increasing Islamization of regional ethnic political 
consciousness has not augured well for modernization and the secularization of 
Central Asian states. 
The foregoing is tied to a strong anti-Russian sentiment and the fact that, as an 
ethnic group, the Russians assumed an air of superiority and ever since they set foot 
in  Central  Asia.  That  superiority  had  them  looking  down  on  the  local 
groups/inhabitants  as  backward  and ignorant. After independence, however, the 
locals in the various Central Asian countries have attempted to reassert themselves in 
ethno-national terms and have begun to make the Russians aware of the fact that they 
are not exactly welcome. So after the Soviet Union disintegrated and after the demise 
of socialism, the independent countries of Central Asia also witnessed the vigorous 
rebirth of religion in the form of Islamic consciousness.   
In  Uzbekistan  the  spread  of  Islam  was  most  rapid,  and  while  religious 
consciousness is not a threat in itself, in the hands of ethnic entrepreneurs (Allahar 
2004) it has the potential to be. As Qian Zongqi notes, “religious propaganda may 
become the catalyst for social contradictions when the social and economic situation 
worsens.” According to this author, in Uzbekistan where the per capita monthly 
income is only $2–$9, poverty is grinding, but yet not as bad as it is in Kyrgyzstan 
and  Tajikistan.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  to  discover  that  “Under  the 
circumstances, someone sedulously propagandizing radical ideas with the aid of 
religion  would  undoubtedly  be  pouring  oil  on  fire,  and  conflicts  would  be 
intensified” (Ibidem). What Qian Zongqi is suggesting is that the opening for ethnic 
entrepreneurship is very clear and this is a fact that is not lost on religious activists 
and political aspirants (ethnic entrepreneurs) from countries such as Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Pakistan, who have played a key role in the religious renaissance via 
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This is the context in which the civil war in Tajikistan is to be understood as 
leading to antagonisms with the government of Uzbekistan in 1999. Inside Tajikistan 
extremist  religious  forces  sought  to  oppose  all  attempts  at  modernization  and 
secularization and pushed instead for the promotion of a Islamic consciousness. The 
example of Tajikistan had a direct echo in Uzbekistan where the ethnic entrepreneurs 
at the head of the opposition Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (UIM) pursued the 
creation of an Islamic republic and engaged in armed conflicts with the government 
forces in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. When those conflicts ended with the 
triumph of the Uzbek government the immediate result was a refugee flood of 
Muslim Uzbeks into Tajikistan as relations between both countries cooled. Today 
the economic situation has not improved and the situation remains quite volatile. 
As  shall  be  argued  presently,  the  global  struggles  for  ethnic  and  national 
self-determination and sovereignty are closely bound up with struggles for identity, 
and those in turn are directly linked to struggles for a homeland or a territorial 
‘home’ base from which to operate. This concern with the land, with who owns it and 
who belongs on it or to it, has come to define a huge part of modern politics in the 
global age of physical displacement, diasporic identity, cultural uprooting, and the 
search for belonging. It is about a dual sense of identity and  belonging: a. the 
psychological or individual, and b. the sociological or group sense. But ‘belonging’ 
also  implies  boundaries  that  separate  those  of  the  in-group  from  those  of  the 
out-group.  What criteria, then, are employed in setting those boundaries?   
It seems to me that one of the clearest answers to this question is place of birth: 
where one is born is a vital part of who one is; of one’s identity. Thus, the English 
term ‘nation,’ can be traced directly to the Latin verb nasci (to be born). As will be 
seen, however, given my focus on ‘ethnic nationalism’ in the modern world, the 
matter is a great deal more complex than this. For example, whereas the Greeks have 
just one word to express this combined or compound idea, ethnos, which means both 
‘ethnic’ and ‘nation,’ other societies make a definite distinction between the two. To 
elaborate, in Greek the notions of ethnicity and nationality are synonymous, and 
such terms as ethnikos (ethnic or national) and ethnikotis (ethnicity or nationality), 
would suggest that the concept of ‘ethnic nationalism’ is somewhat redundant. This 
is so because the Greek conception of ethnos speaks to the idea of a nation-state or a 
state that comprises a single ethnic group. This is obviously very much at odds with 
most modern day multiethnic states such as those that characterize the Caribbean 
region, where the contested politics of national identity can and has assumed ethnic 
dimensions, and is often conducted in competitive and acrimonious terms. But it is 
not necessarily irrelevant to the post-socialist states of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia. 
To return to the idea of belonging, the basic social and gregarious make-up of 
human beings is seen to be bound up with their above-mentioned search for ‘home.’ 
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unnatural and leads to feelings of insecurity and vulnerability (Allahar 1994: 18–21). 
And this is why Benedict Anderson could write that, “... nation-ness and nationalism 
command such profound emotional legitimacy” (1983: 13–14). Much like being the 
member  of  a  family,  to  be  rooted  in  one’s  own  land  implies  an  unquestioned 
acceptance  by  fellows  and  a  sense  of  belonging  that  is  both  physically  and 
emotionally reassuring. Speaking specifically about the individual in the group, 
Harold Isaacs wrote: 
 
He is not only not alone, but here, as long as he chooses to remain in and 
of it, he cannot be denied or rejected. It is an identity he might want to conceal, 
abandon, or change, but it is the identity that no one can take away from him. It 
is home in the sense of Robert Frost’s line, the place where, when you’ve got to 
go there, they’ve got to take you in (Isaacs 1975: 43; emphasis in original). 
THE POINT OF DEPARTURE 
This  said,  the  present  paper  aims  to  propose  a  schema  for  analysing  the 
contemporary  politics  of  national  and  ethnic  identity  in  post-colonial  and 
post-socialist  states.  To  this  end  it  will  seek:  a.  to  provide  a  comprehensive 
operational definition of nationalism, b. to qualify that definition by the addition of 
the  adjective  ‘ethnic,’  and  c.  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  concept  ‘ethnic 
nationalism’ can help us to understand some of the politics of ethnicity and national 
identity in a post-independence (whether post-colonial or post-socialist) setting. My 
argument  will  be  situated  within  the  broad  theoretical  framework  of  a 
non-reductionist,  neo-Marxist  class  analysis,  for  it  is  my  conviction  that 
ethno-national consciousness and politics are better understood if we are able to trace 
the concrete class interests and motives of their promoters. 
To  begin,  there  is  so  much  disagreement  over  the  definition  and  proper 
meaning of ‘nationalism’ as a concept, that Ernst Haas has questioned why bother 
even to ask ‘what is nationalism and why should we study it’ (Haas 1986)? At the 
very broadest of levels, nationalism can be seen as an ideology espoused by those 
who live in already-established nations, complete with economic, political, legal, 
military, economic and civic autonomy in a clearly demarcated territorial space.  
Thus, the ideology of nationalism can, and has been used to rally individuals and 
groups behind the flag of a nation, to give them a sense of belonging to that nation, 
and to separate them from others who do not belong.  But as an ideology, the term 
nationalism can also be used to characterize a sentiment, a yearning or movement for 
independence and autonomy on the part peoples, who, though sharing what Clifford 
Geertz calls “a corporate sentiment of oneness” and “a consciousness of kind” (1973: 
b260;  307),  do  not  yet  inhabit  a  clearly  defined  territorial  space.    Therefore, 5  Politics    17 
nationalist movements are quintessentially political movements. And as we have 
seen in the srtugglesof various social and cultural groups from the former USSR, 
national and cultural identities are neither natural nor automatic. As Daniel Chirot 
writes: “almost all the present nations would like to become nation-states, but many 
nations are actually parts of other states, and many states are not nation-states” 
(1977: b11). 
It is this latter phenomenon that interests me most. For I see the situation as 
quite suggestive of post-colonial and post-socialist social formations in areas such as 
the former Soviet Union and the Caribbean, where multi-ethnic states like those of 
Russian Federation and the Caribbean house ‘nations’ in search of ‘homes.’ I am 
thinking of nations as ethnic groupings that share the above-mentioned “corporate 
sentiment of oneness,” and of homes as places (territories) where the members of 
such groupings can feel a sense of unquestioned belonging and acceptance. My 
approach to ‘the nation,’ then, deals as much with unwritten sentiment as with 
juridical  meaning,  and  differs  somewhat  from  Anthony  Giddens’  strictly 
state-centered view:  
 
By a ‘nation’ I refer to a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated 
territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored 
both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states. A ‘nation’ only 
exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over 
which its sovereignty is claimed (Giddens 1984:116). 
 
Whether dealing with capitalist or socialist colonialism, colonies and those 
colonial subjects that inhabit them are by definition not independent or sovereign 
entities.  It  is  possible,  however,  for  colonial  subjects  to  develop  a  sense  of 
nation-ness and to agitate for independence and national self-determination while 
still under the colonizers’ yoke. This was clearly the case in  the former Soviet 
republics of Georgia and Chechenia, and in the English-speaking Caribbean on the 
eve of independence as Crown Colony government paved the way for the emergence 
of nationalist politics. However, it is after securing political independence, whether 
by war or by peaceful negotiation with the colonial master, that the process of nation 
building can be said to begin. But since no two countries are exactly alike in their 
historical experiences, their social class structure and composition, their natural 
resource endowment, their demographic make-up, or even in the specific values that 
their cultures embrace, the process of nation building can be expected to vary from 
country to country. It stands to reason too, that in multiethnic states where two or 
more ethnic groups are more or less even in numbers, the process of nation building 
could be a very contentious one. And this is likely to be even more accentuated 
where  the  ethnic  groups  in  question  have  a  developed  racialized consciousness 
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Further, in order fully to understand the sentiment of nationalism one must 
look at its proponents and interrogate their motives. In other words, whether as 
sentiment  or  as  movement,  nationalism  cannot  be  divorced  from  the  class  and 
political interests of its leading promoters. By this I mean that nationalism, along 
with the peculiar brands of ideological appeal that nationalists make, will most often 
be linked to the discrete economic and political interests of its champions.  But one 
must be cautious in absolutizing the class claim, for in the specific case of ethnic 
nationalism, for example, Robin Williams has noted that “to dismiss ethnicity as 
false consciousness ignores the clear evidence that ethnies often sacrifice economic 
interests in favour of symbolic gains” (1994: 64–65). Even beyond this, economic 
gain is not all that is sacrificed for as Ronaldo Munck reminds us, “nationalism 
matters because people die for it”. And, “If people are prepared to die for their 
country, then this must be a phenomenon worth investigating” (1986: 2). The class 
reductionism  of  orthodox  Marxism  must  therefore  be  guarded  against,  for  at 
different times some peoples and groups will value the symbolic and cultural aspects 
of group identity higher than the rationally calculated, economic and political gains 
to be derived (or lost) from pursuing class interests.   
On  the  other  hand,  as  will  be  seen  presently,  while  the concept of ‘false 
consciousness’ generally is fraught with difficulty, it cannot be entirely ignored in 
any assessment of the political calculations of specific actors, especially when those 
calculations relate to claims of ethnic belonging. In other words, what to some may 
appear as false consciousness, to others will represent strategic, rational calculation. 
It all depends on the situation at hand, and the long-term and short-term goals and 
class interests of the leading actors. In what follows I will flesh out the concept of 
false consciousness as it speaks to social classes, with a view later to applying it to an 
understanding of ethnic and national consciousness. 
 
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
When discussing class and class consciousness Marx was keen to point out that 
classes, and the proletariat in particular, are not always aware of their potential 
power. As the capitalist mode of production came to supplant feudal social relations 
in the countrysides of Europe, large masses of displaced and dispossessed rural 
dwellers came under the sway of capital, and the beginnings of a proletarian class 
could be detected. But lacking political organization and education in any given 
country, members of this class were not automatically or spontaneously united and 
conscious of their collective strength and possibilities. They amounted to what was 
basically a statistical aggregate, a group of workers brought together merely by the 
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some have termed a class in itself. In time, however, as greater exposure to capitalist 
exploitation  sharpened  the  contradictions  between  this  class  and  the  owners  of 
capital, as their organization and education grew, so too did their consciousness of 
themselves as a class that faced a set of common problems. In the process there also 
developed the awareness of the fact that they could do something to better their 
conditions of existence, but this necessitated the collective action of a class for itself. 
In Marx’s words: 
 
The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, 
common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not 
yet for itself. In the struggle ... this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself 
as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests (Marx 
1963:173; my emphasis). 
 
This said, what is the definition of false consciousness, and how is it related to 
the  themes  that  will  be  pursued  in  the  following pages? Before  answering this 
question I must underscore the point that in a class-reductionist sense, where actors 
are seen generally to lack agency, I find orthodox Marxism to be incomplete as an 
explanation for political behaviour in modern society. However, though incomplete, 
the insights of the orthodox position cannot be entirely dismissed.  What I will do, 
therefore, is to utilize those insights as they are relevant and, where necessary, I will 
provide a critique of them. 
Although the specific term ‘false consciousness’ was never used by Marx, 
there are many allusions to the term in Marx’s work, and within the Marxist literature 
generally, it is quite commonly encountered in analyses of such phenomena as class 
consciousness, revolution, and ideology. As argued above, class consciousness or 
class awareness, speaks to the notion that a social class is made up of individuals who 
share a set of common interests, are politically aware of this fact, and are indeed 
capable of acting together to promote and defend those common interests. False 
consciousness, conversely, describes a situation in which individuals who share that 
common class situation are not aware of the fact, and as a consequence are not able to 
conceive of acting in concert to pursue their interests. As George Ritzer has written:  
 
The ideas of class consciousness and false consciousness are closely 
related in Marx’s work.  Both refer to idea systems shared by social classes. In 
capitalism both capitalists and workers have incorrect assessments of how the 
system works and of their role and interest in it (false consciousness).... What 
is characteristic of capitalism, for both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is 
false consciousness (1992: 172). 
 
Though correct, Ritzer’s contribution is not original, for given the structure 
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both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are subject to false consciousness. The main 
difference is that bourgeois class consciousness leads to false consciousness because 
the bourgeoisie is unable to see beyond capitalism as a system, and end up by 
creating the conditions for their own demise as a class: “the barrier which converts 
the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie into ‘false’ consciousness is objective; the 
class situation itself” (Lukács 1971: 54). To which might be added Marx and Engels’ 
forecast  that:  “What  the  bourgeoisie  therefore  produces,  above  all,  are  its  own 
gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable” (Marx 
and Engels 1955: 22). Stated differently, the bourgeoisie is incapable of solving the 
crises of capitalism for it is locked into a logic of exploitation and accumulation that 
produces  increasingly  unmanageable  economic  crises  (e.g.  overproduction  and 
underconsumption), that in turn condition the development of opposition political 
consciousness within the proletariat. The vision of the bourgeoisie thus “becomes 
obscured  as  soon  as  it  is  called  upon  to  face  problems  that  remain  within  its 
jurisdiction but which point beyond the limits of capitalism” (Lukács 1971: 54).   
On the other hand, the sheer survival of the proletariat as a class presents us 
with an instructive contradiction whereby it is compelled to envision an alternative 
to  capitalism.  And  that  alternative,  which  is  supposedly  socialism,  will  see  the 
disappearance of the proletariat qua proletariat. This notwithstanding, Lukács writes 
that “the protracted death struggle of the bourgeoisie” is dialectically related to the 
fact that “only the consciousness of the proletariat can point to the way that leads out 
of the impasse of capitalism” (Ibidem: 68, 76). Following this logic Ritzer is able to 
claim that, “The bourgeoisie can never transform its false consciousness into true 
class consciousness; this is possible only for the proletariat” (1992: 173). The idea 
here is that, in calling the proletariat into existence, the bourgeoisie unwittingly sows 
the seeds of its own destruction; but the dilemma is systemic and lies beyond the 
reach of individual actors or the capitalist class as a whole. 
But what about proletarian false consciousness? In  The German Ideology, 
Marx and Engels acknowledged the limitations of reductionism and mechanical 
thinking when they wrote that, “…man also possesses ‘consciousness’,” but owing 
to the dominance of bourgeois ideology and the vicissitudes of daily living, it is “not 
inherent,  not  ‘pure’  consciousness”  (1947:  19).  In  other  words,  rather  than 
romanticizing the worker as an always-conscious and informed revolutionary actor, 
Marx and Engels understood the power and pervasiveness of bourgeois ideology and 
the  practical  difficulties  that  militated  against  effective  proletarian  political 
education and the development of class consciousness.   
Given the exploitive, oppressive and alienating conditions under which the 
worker is forced to live and work, and speaking specifically of the relationship 
between ideology, consciousness and political action, Engels was led to write the 
following in a letter to Franz Mehring in 1893: “Ideology is a process accomplished 
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real motive forces compelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply 
would not be an ideological process” (1977: 496). What he is suggesting is that 
workers, even the most exploited, who are often steeped in the bourgeois ideologies 
of individualism and materialism, are not to be expected automatically to develop a 
critical  class  understanding  their  difficult  life  circumstances.  In  addition,  what 
objectively might be in the best long-term interests of the worker (e.g., joining a 
labour union), might be resisted out of fear of losing his or her job, or rejected in 
favour of a course of individual action (e.g., snitching to the boss), that is tailored 
more to his or her immediate or short-term interests: job security. This example of 
what is supposedly false consciousness points up the question of rationality and the 
fact that what may be seen as an appropriate and rational decision in the short-term, 
may in the fullness of time just turn out to have been wrong. 
Because human beings are subjective beings who are subjectively involved in 
their worlds, their apprehensions of those worlds are understandably ideologically 
formed. This means that any talk about the existence of ‘objectivity’ or an ‘objective 
reality’ is bound to be itself ideological.  So, to speak of consciousness as somehow 
‘false’ begs the question of what ‘true’ consciousness is, and how one might go about 
discovering it. This means that class consciousness and false consciousness are 
matters of subjective imputation, which led Georg Lukács to observe that: 
 
It must not be thought, however, that all classes ripe for hegemony have 
a class consciousness with the same inner structure. Everything hinges on the 
extent to which they can become conscious of the actions they need to perform 
in order to obtain and organize power. The question then becomes: how far 
does the class concerned perform the actions that history has imposed on it 
‘consciously’  or  ‘unconsciously’?  And  is  that  consciousness  ‘true’  or 
‘false’(Lukács 1971: 53). 
 
Although he was roughly of the same mind as Marx and Engels on the question 
of false consciousness, Lenin was even less inclined to romanticize the revolutionary 
potential of the proletariat. Indeed, talking about ideology and political action, he 
was opposed to seeing the working class as specially endowed with a ‘spontaneous,’ 
proletarian, revolutionary consciousness. For him consciousness was created, not 
given. It was the culmination of a period of education and struggle, for the the 
working class was so dominated by bourgeois ideology that it could not be expected 
automatically, naturally or spontaneously to develop a revolutionary consciousness.  
Equating working class revolutionary consciousness with socialist consciousness, 
Lenin was in full agreement with Karl Kautsky whom he quotes as follows in What is 
to be done?: 
 
... socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian 
class  struggle  from  without  and  not  something  that  arose  within  it 
spontaneously.  the  task  of  Social  Democracy  is  to  imbue  the  proletariat 
[literally: saturate the proletariat] with the consciousness of its position and the 
consciousness of its task (1969: 40).     Anton L. Allahar  10  22 
Then  Lenin  goes  on  to  add  his  own  views  to  the  effect  that  trade  union 
consciousness amounted to false consciousness. For what trade unions encouraged 
was a narrow economism according to which workers focussed entirely on their local, 
individual, material interests and in the process lost sight totally of the wider class 
struggle for socialism and proletarian internationalism. Thus, he writes: “Since 
there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses 
themselves … the only choice is – either bourgeois or socialist ideology…trade 
unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie” 
(Lenin 1969: 40–41). In sum, then, false consciousness is a thorny term, but if 
carefully  nuanced,  will  nevertheless  prove  useful  for  my  analysis  of  ethnic 
nationalism, the motives that impel ethnic entrepreneurs (Allahar 2004), and the 
class interests that underlie “the activism of Third World leaders bent on inventing 
nations where they do not exist, and engaged in the project of constructing the 
nation-to-be” (Smith 1988: 6). 
 
ETHNIC NATIONALISM 
 
My  definition  of  the  term  ‘ethnic’  includes  the  notion  of  identity  and  is 
borrowed in part from Anthony Smith, for whom an ethnic community, or ethnie, is 
“a  named  human  population  possessing  a  myth  of  common  descent,  common 
historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a particular 
territory, and a sense of solidarity” (Smith 1988: 9). To this extent it is well known 
that myth is a crucial element in cementing national unity. Take for example, the 
recounting of history in the post-independence (1991) case of Ukraine as compared 
with that of Belarus. The determination to write the history of Ukraine and Belarus 
from a Ukrainian and Belarusian perspective was intimately tied to the need for 
(re)discovering or inventing one’s history, traditions and myths. Thus, in the specific 
case of Ukraine the struggle to (re)claim the legacy of the medieval state of Kyiv Rus 
was a project given over to historians and historiographers, who have sought to 
enhance the national mythology and to give ethnic Ukrainians a marker by which to 
root  or  to  anchor  their  ethnic  identity  (Kuzio  2006).  The  process  of  national 
re-building in Belarus, on the other hand, was somewhat different owing to the fact 
that “Belarus had little mythology as an independent nation to draw upon” (Kuzio 
and Nordberg1999: 72).  
Related to the question of myth in the formation of national identity is the idea 
of ‘situational ethnicity,’ which sees ethnic identity as “incipient, problematic, and 
situationally determined” (Nagel and Olzak 1982: 129), and which implies that, 
since not all ethnic groups are politically mobilized at all times, ethnic mobilization 
is a calculated, rational response to the challenges faced by some ethnic groups at 
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nationalists with ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia, Serbia, Chechenia, in Rwanda and 
Burundi, and with establishing purity of African and Indian roots among various 
Caribbean populations are cases in point (Allahar 2004). This said, I will understand 
(ethnic) nationalism as an ideological claim, or a movement seeking to make such a 
claim, of self-determination and sovereignty. Integral to this  statement is a. the 
existence of some bounded territory or ‘nation’ over which nationalists already have 
jurisdiction and are able to maintain it, or b. in the case of a nationalist movement, 
some bounded territory over which members wish to claim jurisdiction. 
The emphasis on ‘territory’ as an important dimension of ethno-national unity 
can be seen in the example of Central Asia following the demise of the Soviet Union.  
For apart from the historical processes of migration, one of the main reasons for 
today’s conflicts in that region is to be traced back to the Soviet Union and the 
frequent interference with borders that led to a situation where many of the various 
ethnic groups that historically inhabited the region are scattered across areas that 
were not formerly their own. As a consequence to date there are at least 10 disputed 
territories in the wider region as ethnic sentiments have been reawakened and leaders 
of ethnic movements have come to the fore to fan the flames of ethnic insecurity and 
ethnic uprooting. 
 
A WORKING DEFINITION 
 
In an attempt to deal analytically with the density of the concept of nationalism 
scholars have spoken of two broad types: a. modern civic or territorial nationalism, 
where the nation is legally or juridically defined, and contains clear class elements 
and b. a more traditional ethnic or genealogical nationalism, where the nation is more 
ethnically  and  culturally  defined  (Calhoun  1993:221).  The  civic  definition  sees 
territory as central but adds a common economy, common laws that apply equally to 
all citizens, a public mass educational system, shared administrative and military 
institutions, and a single civic ideology (Smith 1988: 9). The latter will include such 
charged  political  symbols  as  a  national  flag,  a  national  anthem,  a  national 
coat-of-arms  and  a  set  of  national  holidays.  Deciding  on  which  of  these  will 
represent the nation is potentially a matter of intense and continuing political debate 
among co-nationals, especially in the case of a multiethnic nation-state, whether 
already formed or in the process of formation.   
As a mode of political being, civic nationalism was expected to be m ore 
prevalent  in  those  nation  states  such  as  are  encountered  in  post-colonial  and 
post-independence Eastern Europe and the Caribbean. And it is the fact of their 
multi-ethnic make-up that renders the debate over ethno-national identity so intense 
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the class dimensions of civic nationalism often shade into and become complicated 
by the re-awakened ethnic consciousness so characteristic of modern society. Thus 
viewed, ethnic nationalism, both historically and today, is to be found where ethnic 
groups assert themselves as nations (e.g. the Nation of Islam in the US or the First 
Nations in Canada), or else where they are in the process of reasserting national 
status. Once more the example of Eastern Slavic nationalisms come to mind as one 
tries to make sense of the question of national identity and nationalism in the context 
of politics and history in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
Thus,  in  examining  the  three  Eastern  Slavic  peoples  known  as  Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belarusians political analysts have paid much attention to the issue of 
ethnic recognition. Given the power and the imperialistic motives of the Russians, 
during the period of the USSR leading politicians steadfastly refused to regard the 
Ukraine and Belarus as foreign countries with separate ethnic identities. Thus, Kuzio 
(2006) tells us, in the writing of the history of the region the Russophile (Russian 
imperial) and Sovietophile (Soviet) versions were always dominant and they treated 
Ukraine and Belarus largely as appendages of Russia. Indeed, any talk of Ukrainian 
independence was seen by Sovietophile historians as ‘unnatural’ for nature had 
decreed that the country was naturally part of the Russian union (2006: 408). In the 
post-independence era, however, an Eastern Slavic and Ukrainophile (Ukrainian 
national) historiography has sought to set the record straight by according Ukraine and 
Belarus the roles of independent actors on the historical stage. 
So, similar to the Greek usage described earlier, my understanding of the term 
‘ethnic’ is closely bound up with that of ‘nation;’ and ‘ethnic’ is meant to designate 
those groups that experience a distinct sense of we-ness, or what can be called 
nation-ness, that claim a common history, a common line of ancestral descent, and a 
common culture complete with a set of common customs and unifying myths. While 
it is generally felt that civic nationalism is more modern and grew out of this earlier 
form of ethno-cultural nationalism, the contemporary politics of ethnic nationalism 
in the Caribbean and the former Soviet Union suggests, if not the reverse, at least a 
return to the earlier form of group identification. 
Ethnic nationalism, then, is to be found in situations where a discrete ethnic 
group lays claim to a national identity and patrimony that a. separates it from other 
groups, ethnic or non-ethnic, and b. has in mind a clear territorial base. Given the 
above discussion of civic nationalism, it goes without saying that not all nationalism 
is ethnically driven, for there are numerous examples of multi-ethnic nations or 
multi-ethnic states in which class forms the basis for nationalist appeals. Therefore, 
any comprehensive definition of nationalism will have to include both the civic and 
ethnic dimensions of the phenomenon. Caught up in the dislocating economics and 
politics of globalization, certain countries in the former USSR, for example, Ukraine, 
Georgia and even in the Caucasus region and the contemporary Caribbean, evince a 
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various ethnic entrepreneurs attempt to capitalize on the peoples’ general sense of 
cultural uprootedness and dislocation. As will be seen presently, the entrepreneurs in 
question are not averse to excavating (their invented version of) history with a view 
to mobilizing specific ethnic groups for political ends:  
 
The  aim  is  to  present  a  vivid,  archaeologically  faithful  and 
comprehensive record of the nation from the dawn of its existence until the 
present  in  a  convincing  and  dramatic  narrative  form,  which  will  inspire 
members of the ethnie to return to ancestral ways and ideals, and mobilise 
them  to  create  on  its  basis  a  modern  nation,  or,  in  nationalist  language, 
‘reawaken the nation’ (Smith 1988: 13). 
 
Viewed in this way, the overall process of mobilization involves a reciprocity 
between the two approaches to nationalism whereby both appear to be mutually 
reinforcing as ethnic groups compete for the right to (re)name or (re)define the 
juridical nation. And when parties to the competition are of roughly equal power and 
resources, refusal to yield or compromise will tend to result in separatism or ethnic 
strife. 
The foregoing is related to one additional matter which concerns the idea of 
territory or the ‘home’ in ‘homeland.’ As Harold Isaacs charges: “Territory has a 
critical role to play in maintaining group separateness; without it a ‘nationality’ has 
difficulty becoming a ‘nation’ and a ‘nation’ cannot become a state” (1975: 53). This 
is particularly important in the modern age of globalization, diasporas, long distance 
travel, and mass migrations, and is intimately bound up with the politics of identity 
and belonging. For whether one is driven out of one’s homeland as a slave, an 
indentured  worker,  a  political refugee, or for reasons of economic hardship, or 
simply for purposes of family reunification, diasporic politics and the nostalgic 
imaginings of home from abroad are crucial elements in the territorial aspects of 
identity and belonging to a homeland. What we do know, however, is that even those 
communities that have lost their homelands through colonial or imperial conquest, 
war, migration and so on, will continue to root themselves in the world by reference, 
even spiritually, to that (imagined) homeland. 
 
MARXISM AND NATIONALISM 
 
Of  the  various  attempts  to  deal  analytically  with  the  vexing  question  of 
nationalism, I have found the work of neo-Marxists to be the most sophisticated and 
instructive. Among them, however, there is no automatic, agreed-upon consensus.  
Thus,  as  a  neo-Marxist,  when  Tom  Nairn  wrote:  “The  theory  of  nationalism 
represents  Marxism’s  great  historical  failure”  (1975:  3),  he  was  echoing  the   Anton L. Allahar  14  26 
sentiments  of  many  like-minded  others,  who  were  caught  off-guard  by  the 
persistence of nationalist and ethnic identity allegiance right into the modern era of 
global capitalism.  But Marxists were not the only ones guilty of this shortcoming, 
for functionalists, modernization and dependency theorists, among many others, 
were convinced that the social identities of clan, tribe, village, ethnicity and nation 
would  not  survive  into  the  modern  period.  The  exigencies  of  modern  living, 
industrialization,  secularization,  urbanization,  the  destruction  of  traditional 
community and the ‘freeing’ of the individual, were all expected to dictate a more 
rational  approach  to  identity  and  survival.  Life  in  a  thriving  and  bustling 
metropolitan setting, it was felt, would be based more on one’s occupational and 
economic position than one’s membership in a tribe, clan, family or ethnic group. 
Indeed, all the other non-class forms of identity and awareness, particularly the 
ethnic and nationalist ones, were felt by Marxists to constitute epiphenomena – a 
false consciousness; to be distractions from the true realization of the roots of class 
(economic) exploitation and political disenfranchisement (Campbell 1972: 5–6). 
Given Marx and Engels’ political and ideological commitment to socialism 
and the politics of class struggle, it is not difficult to understand why they would 
have downplayed the questions of ethnic and national consciousness. But as the 
historical record demonstrates, even if the above-noted expectations may have been 
warranted in their time, world events over the past 100 years have proven them 
wrong. Benedict Anderson says it well: “…the ‘end of the era of nationalism,’ so 
long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally 
legitimate value in the political life of our time” (1983: 12). As we know, the 
processes of colonization, slavery, imperialism and globalization have done more to 
keep global ethnic and national consciousness alive than Marx and Engels ever could 
have predicted. Further, because their political vision was internationalist (Munck 
1986: 3), it is understandable that Marx and Engels would have been opposed to 
nationalism.  The  final  sentence  of  The  Communist  Manifesto  is  clear  in  its 
exhortation: “Workingmen of all countries, unite!” (1955: 46; my emphasis).   
This exhortation was based on their view that the development of capitalism 
would internationalize exploitation and thereby eliminate the national differences 
among the proletariats of various countries. On this basis they claimed that “the 
workingmen have no country,” for “National differences and antagonisms between 
peoples are vanishing ... owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of 
commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production...” (Ibidem: 
29). Their point was not so much that working men (and women) had lost their 
countries to the forces of capitalism and imperialism, but rather that the historic role 
of  the  proletariat  was  one  of  international  solidarity  against  the  forces  of 
imperialism.  
In the estimation of Marx and Engels the proletarian struggle was aimed at 
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countries. For this reason nationalist consciousness appeared to them as divisive of 
the international proletarian solidarity in struggle, as false consciousness, and they 
tended to ignore it. As V. G. Kiernan has noted: “...nationality in itself was not a 
theme that greatly interested them; they looked forward to its speedy demise, and in 
the meantime were far more concerned with its component elements, social classes”. 
And: “Nationalism is a subject on which Marx and Engels are commonly felt to have 
gone astray, most markedly in their earlier years, by greatly underestimating a force 
which was about to grow explosively” (1983: 344; 346). 
This  point  was  picked  up  by  Marxists  like  Lenin  and  Stalin  and  those 
neo-Marxists  who  followed  them.  For  by  the  turn  of  the  20
th  century,  when 
imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism, became manifest, movements for 
national  liberation  in  Europe  showed  that:  “...where  a  straightforward  struggle 
against  imperialism  was  being  waged,  fusion  or  linkage  of  socialism  with 
nationalism  won  many  successes”  (Kiernan  1983:  349).  Thus,  throughout  the 
remainder of that century there was an uneasy, very tenuous alliance between those 
nationalist movements that waged wars of national liberation and those Marxist 
movements  that  struggled  for  socialism.  But  the  stand-off  was  not  as 
black-and-white as many have made it out to be; for despite their internationalist 
politics, Marx and Engels did acknowledge that the struggle for socialism is more 
practically waged in the first instance at the national level: “the struggle of the 
proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each 
country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie” (Marx 
and Engels 1955: 21). This is a very important point to underscore, particularly 
because ideological opponents of Marxism are so quick to distort the record and 
claim,  as  Ronaldo  Munck  does,  that  “Essentially,  Marxism  has  no  theory  of 
nationalism” (1986: 2). Hence, though aware of the limitations and distractions of 
nationalist consciousness, Marx and Engels recognized the need to incorporate some 
consideration of that consciousness as part of the process of the larger struggle for 
socialism. How, then, does the so-called national question become articulated with 
the ethnic dimension of the struggle for emancipation in multi-ethnic, post-colonial 
settings such as the former Soviet republics and the Caribbean? 
 
CLASS AND NATIONALISM 
 
Regarding the class aspects of nationalism, and in the specific context of the 
Caribbean, I want to offer some more theoretical observations and suggest three 
ideal-types of class-bound nationalism: a. bourgeois nationalism; b. petty-bourgeois 
nationalism; and c. popular or working-class nationalism. The key questions in each 
of these is: which class gets to name or define the nation? Which class’ vision and 
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The  first  example  of  nationalism,  bourgeois  nationalism,  is  the  type with 
which we are most familiar. It encompasses the kind of appeal that the capitalist class 
in Europe made early in the development and consolidation of national economies 
and  the  identification  of  national  boundaries.  This  type  of  nationalism  is  very 
effective  in  fostering  false  consciousness  and  distracting  the  middle-  and 
working-classes  from  a  clear  understanding  of  their  economic  and  political 
exploitation  and  disenfranchisement.  It  suggests  that  national  allegiance  and 
devotion, from which the bourgeoisie stands to benefit, are paramount and represent 
the only viable route to sovereignty, security, national unity and prosperity. 
As  a  political  ideology,  bourgeois  nationalism  works  hand-in-hand  with 
capitalism  and  liberalism,  which  seek  to  portray  the  private  concerns  of  the 
bourgeoisie, rationalization of business practices, bureaucratic efficiency and the 
securing of huge profits, as benefiting the nation as a whole. Even in those cases 
where rationalism and efficiency demand downsizing, out-sourcing, job losses and 
worker dislocation, bourgeois nationalists tout these as ‘natural’ occurrences in any 
healthy  economy.  The  class  vision  of  bourgeois  nationalists  is  one  which 
understands the nation and its wealth as belonging to the bourgeoisie, and although 
some concessions have to be made to other social class fractions and groups along 
the way, in the final analysis the lion’s share of the political and economic spoils 
belongs to their class. Thus conceived, bourgeois nationalism sprang from European 
capitalism and the various wars of the 18
th and 19
th centuries that were aimed at 
nation building on that continent. In the process, as European capitalism spread 
across national boundaries to encompass new lands and continents, especially the 
Americas, it consolidated itself in the practices of colonialism, imperialism and 
globalization, giving birth to today’s imperialist bourgeoisie, which has such a direct 
hand in the moulding of nationalisms in the rest of the (developing) world. Curiously, 
with the world as its economic playground, the imperialist bourgeoisie is more 
internationalist than nationalist, for internationalism today is a defining feature of 
globalization and neo-liberalism. Thus, whereas Marx and Engels clearly favoured 
the idea of ‘internationalism’ as it spoke to the proletariat, they clearly opposed the 
bourgeois version of such internationalism. 
The second type of nationalism, petty-bourgeois nationalism, is, as the name 
suggests.  It is a form of bourgeois nationalism albeit on a somewhat smaller (petit or 
petty) scale. Of course it is not possible to quantify nationalism per se, so what do I 
mean by ‘smaller scale’? Quite simply, petty-bourgeois nationalism in this usage 
speaks to the scale of surplus value appropriation of the petty-bourgeoisie relative to 
the scale of bourgeois appropriation. For example, whereas in economic matters one 
fraction of the bourgeoisie will favour policies of free trade in those areas where it 
has comparative advantage, the petty-bourgeoisie is more traditionally in favour of 
protectionism. Unable to compete internationally, the petty-bourgeoisie’s scale of 
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nationalist  appeals,  those  are  aimed  at  promoting  and  protecting  their  specific 
spheres  of  operation:  local  industry,  local  manufacturing,  and  the  exchange  of 
locally-produced goods and services. To this end the petty-bourgeoisie is also keen, 
to the extent it is possible, to have control of, or input into the post-colonial state, 
where decisions governing the operations of the local economy are taken.  
So  whereas  there  exists  a  petty-bourgeoisie  in  the  countries  of  advanced 
capitalism, I wish to call attention to the petty-bourgeoisie in the so-called Third 
World or developing countries, and the attempts of the latter to define the nation 
politically  and  economically.  Understanding  the  position  of  the T h i r d  W o r l d  
petty-bourgeoisie is very complex owing to the fact that some scholars use the term 
‘petty-bourgeoisie’ to refer to the class fraction that has political control of the 
post-colonial political order and the state (Fanon 1963; Sudama 1983; Dupuy 1991), 
while  others  focus  on  the  Third  World  petty-bourgeoisie  as  a  class  that  is 
economically subordinated to the imperialist bourgeoisie (Frank 1972; Chirot 1977; 
1986). In the present context I will treat the petty-bourgeoisie as a single class with 
distinct  economic  and  political  fractions,  that  are  also  given  to  intra-bourgeois 
conflicts at specific moments.   
I  am  thus  in  agreement  with  Trevor  Sudama,  when  he  wrote  that  “the 
petty-bourgeoisie emerged as a class in the pursuit of control over the post colonial 
state apparatus” (1983: 77), but at the same time this class was limited to the role of 
junior partner of the imperialist bourgeoisie. For this reason, whether in its political 
or economic guise, petty-bourgeois nationalism contains no critique of capitalism, is 
generally reformist, and seeks mainly to accommodate the interests of the imperialist 
bourgeoisie. This means that petty-bourgeois nationalism is guided by the clear class 
goal of securing a space for its own economic and political manoeuvers in between 
the  imperialist  bourgeoisie  and  the  working  classes.  To  this  extent  the 
petty-bourgeoisie is a class that has had different names, some of which are not too 
flattering. André Gunder Frank (1972) called it the “lumpenbourgeoisie”, while 
Frantz Fanon, who saw it as a “national bourgeoisie”, felt nevertheless that its 
behaviour was that “of a traditional bourgeoisie, of a bourgeoisie which is stupidly, 
contemptibly, cynically bourgeois” (1963: 150).   
Alex  Dupuy  has  dubbed  the  political  fraction  of  this  class  a  managerial 
bourgeoisie  given  the  fact  of  its  control  of  the  post-colonial  state,  and  that  in 
exercising state control it is answerable to the will of the international corporate 
bourgeoisie  (Dupuy  1991:  75).  Because  the  economic  wealth  of  Third  World 
countries is largely owned and controlled by the international corporate (imperialist) 
bourgeoisie, access to power and privilege among local classes is seen to come from 
control of the local state apparatus, for this is the most promising avenue to power, 
prestige,  personal  enrichment  and  privilege  via  graft,  corruption,  and  other 
less-than-legal means. On penalty of removal from power, and as junior partners of 
the imperialist bourgeoisie, members of this class are obliged to do the bidding of the 
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Understood in this way, the Third World petty-bourgeoisie can be seen to 
comprise two separate class fractions. The first fraction discussed above can be 
described, not as national, but as anti-national, in that its policies are geared to 
servicing the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie, and are not designed to promote 
truly national or indigenous development of local industry and manufacturing, and 
the  infrastructure  that  accompanies  such  processes.  Writing  about 
post-independence  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Sudama  notes  that  this  class  fraction: 
“hardly ever took an independent position on any question”. It contented itself with 
“the knowledge that the chosen path of capitalist development and the dominant 
influence of the international bourgeoisie guaranteed conditions for the pursuit of its 
economic interests (1983: 80). 
The  second  take  on  the  Third  World  petty-bourgeoisie  is  related t o  t h e  
presence of another important set of local economic actors. I am referring to what 
Chilcote and Edelstein (1974: 735) among others label the comprador bourgeoisie. 
Compared to the other fraction of this class, the comprador bourgeoisie is smaller 
and  weaker,  and  has  a  clear  interest,  not  in  cooperating  with  the  imperialist 
bourgeoisie,  but  in  lessening  the  country’s  degree  of  dependence  on  the  latter. 
Therefore, following the logic of my argument, I dub this fraction the patriotic 
national  bourgeoisie.  For  whether  as  large  landowners,  local  manufacturers, 
merchants and traders, or even financiers, this fraction of the bourgeoisie is one that 
is said to pursue policies that, though bourgeois, are more concerned with harnessing 
the indigenous resources for local industrial growth and development. The activities 
of this class, which, in strictly local-national terms “owns the means of production of 
industrial goods, and whose interests are, as a consequence, opposed to those of 
foreign capital” (Torres Rivas 1977: 39), are also concentrated in the areas of small 
business,  banking,  transportation,  insurance,  real  estate,  legal  and  accounting 
services. Its industrial policies are largely those of protectionism, which serve to 
shelter locally nascent industrial, manufacturing and service operations from ruinous 
foreign competition. 
Compared to the anti-national fraction of this bourgeoisie, which benefits from 
the  partial  freeing  of  trade,  and  which  is  primarily  interested  in  the  export  of 
non-processed or unfinished raw materials, this latter fraction is seen to act more as a 
national, in the patriotic sense of the word, bourgeoisie (Allahar 1990: 227–235). It 
is  not  that  this  patriotic  petty-bourgeoisie  is  somehow  more  virtuous  than  the 
anti-national or even the imperialist bourgeoisie. It just so happens that its class 
interests do not go as clearly and as immediately counter to the interests of the Third 
World nation in question. Given its structurally antagonistic position vis-Β-vis the 
imperialist and anti-national bourgeoisies, the patriotic petty-bourgeoisie is likely to 
be more progressive, but can be expected to stop short of calling for socialism and 
the genuine nationalization of the country’s means of production.  Analytically then, 
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lumpendevelopment. The class fraction that has political control of the state in the 
post-colonial  order,  is  separate  from  the  local  economic  actors  who  control 
commerce and the entire agro-export industry, but who are subject to the laws 
enacted by the former fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie in control of the state.   
In a region such as the post-independence, English-speaking Caribbean, the 
political fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie is composed of the intellectuals, who were 
groomed by the colonizers, and later by the imperialist bourgeoisie, to assume state 
power after the latters’ departure from the colony. They were often educated in the 
universities of the colonizers and former colonizers, steeped in the latter’s political 
culture  and  values,  and  as  a  consequence  their  political  campaigns  were,  and 
continue to be funded, both directly and indirectly, by foreign interests. Writing on 
the eve of independence in 1961 C.L.R. James referred to this group collectively as 
“the  West  Indian  middle  classes”  and  as  “political  nouveaux-riches”,  whose 
“ignorance and disregard of economic development is profound and deeply rooted in 
their past and present situation. They do not even seem to be aware of it… I do not 
know of any social class which lives so completely without ideas any kind” (1980: 
131–134). And half a century later not much has changed. For once elected, this 
petty-bourgeois class of political leaders, the ones who are put in power to carry on 
the business of the colonialist and imperialist bourgeoisies, are also able to call upon 
politically and ideologically sympathetic foreign states to provide military support 
and protection whenever threats to their continued rule, actual or perceived, might 
arise locally. On this score James’ critique of this class, though almost 50 years ago, 
is  still  generally  applicable:  “They  seem  to  aim  at  nothing  more  than  being 
second-rate American citizens… They are dying to find some communists against 
whom they can thunder and so make an easier road to American pockets” (James 
1980: 134). 
This is also the class described by Frantz Fanon variously as “the national 
bourgeoisie” or “the national middle class” (Fanon 1963). And speaking of this class, 
one of Fanon’s foremost interpreters, Irene Gendzier, writes of “the inability of the 
bourgeoisie to act in the national interests” and as exhibiting “a total indifference to 
the needs of the mass of the population; and worst of all, an economically ineffectual 
and pretentious minority” (1973: 218). Generally speaking, neither the political nor 
the economic fractions of the local petty-bourgeoisies in the post-independence 
Caribbean countries is either revolutionary or nationalist in the genuine sense of the 
term, for their principal mandate is to preserve the conditions for the expanded 
reproduction and accumulation of capital. And capitalism has not shown itself to 
have the interests of the masses of any single country, let alone the masses of the 
world, at heart (Allahar 1995: 127). In other words, because the leaders of these 
countries are committed to the retention of capitalism, and even if at times they have 
been known to espouse a populist rhetoric aimed at national mobilization, the fact 
remains that each passing day bears testimony to their inability to deliver the goods 
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Finally, there is working class nationalism, which in my estimation comes 
closest to a true or genuine nationalism. As the largest class  in terms of sheer 
numbers, its policies have the potential, if only statistically, of taking into account 
what is in the best interests of the majority of the nation. On this basis I will argue 
that a genuine working class nationalism, as opposed to a working class nationalism 
based on false consciousness, is a stepping stone to socialism! 
In the same way that the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie of different 
countries are able to promote and pursue class-bound nationalist strategies, one may 
also conceive of popular or working class nationalism. Just as one may speak of a 
capitalist state that serves principally the interests of the capitalist class(es), I am 
speaking here of nationalism as an ideology that informs a worker’s movement bent 
on  creating  a  ‘nation,’  whose  policies  and  programs  are  more  in  tune  with  its 
interests. Because the interests of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie do not 
coincide exactly with those of the working class or the wider masses, it is possible to 
envisage a nationalist claim on the part of workers that goes against that of the 
various petty-bourgeois fractions. But to the extent that the working class is not 
homogeneous and workers do not all share the same politics, how is it possible to 
speak of a workers’ state that will pursue the interests of the working class?   
As hinted above, this is a serious issue, for it begs the question of whether 
nationalist  consciousness  among  the  working  class  is  false  consciousness.  The 
answer has to begin with the acknowledgement that while not all the members of the 
bourgeoisie or the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole will have identical political interests, 
so too, within the working class it is to be expected that there will be political 
differences. And this is where the thorny issue of false consciousness comes into 
play.  Those  members  of  the  working  class,  who,  for  whatever  reasons,  do  not 
challenge bourgeois or petty-bourgeois definitions of what is in the best interest of 
the nation, and whose political stance does not include a critique of capitalism, may 
well  be  said  to  be  suffering  from  false  consciousness.  For  as  I  have  argued, 
throughout its history capitalism has shown itself to be inimical to the long-term 
interests of working people everywhere. 
On the other hand, as long as a significant proportion of the class is organized, 
educated, united and conscious, and as long as they agitate for a nation in which the 
broad interests of workers are protected and promoted, we are able to speak either of 
a  genuine  working  class  nationalism  or  a  genuine  working  class  nationalist 
movement. The latter is relevant in the context of ‘territory,’ for nations that are in 
search  of  homes  are  understandably  concerned  with  the  establishment  of  a 
physical homeland or ‘space’ that they can call theirs: “Possession of territory is, 
after all, a sine qua non of statehood and an essential goal of every nationalism” 
(Smith 1983: XIII).  
In sum, therefore, true working class nationalism is a step toward socialism, or, 
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the proletariat “wins the battle of democracy” (Marx and Engels 1955: 31) and 
establishes a socialist state that the interests of the working class as a whole can 
begin genuinely to be addressed.  This is precisely the sentiment of Marx and Engels 
as  expressed  in  The  Communist  Manifesto:  “In  the  national  struggles  of  the 
proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the 
common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality” (Marx 
and Engels 1955: 23, my emphasis). This is also consistent with the argument of 
Anthony Smith who affirms that: “...nationalism is typically a political argument, a 
tool for seizing the state by mobilizing, coordinating and legitimating the movement 
of the masses” (Smith 1988: 5).   
My argument, then, is that a working class nationalism that is not based on 
false  consciousness  must  in  effect  be  internationalist  in  its  vision,  and  this  is 
synonymous with international socialism. The specifics of such a working class 
movement,  however,  will  understandably  have  to  take  into  consideration  the 
practical conditions facing the working class or proletariat in a given country, be it 
advanced industrial or developing, and the specific socialist content of the policies to 
be implemented once that movement is successful. 
 
CONCLUSION: LEADERSHIP, CLASS AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM 
 
At this point the question of the leadership of such a movement is relevant. 
While the working class is quite capable of generating its own  nationalist (and 
revolutionary) leaders, and in fact has done so with regularity over the years and all 
over the world, one also has to be aware of the political influence of conscious, 
non-proletarian individuals on the proletarian movement. A compelling case in point 
is that of Marx and Engels themselves, who were decidedly not from the working 
class,  yet  they  were  very  cognizant  of  the  potential  for  change  inherent  in  a 
politicized  and  class  conscious  proletariat  that  contained  radical  elements  of 
bourgeois or petty-bourgeois sympathizers: “...in times when the class struggler 
nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, ... 
assumes a violent, glaring character” and it is precisely at this time that “a small 
section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class 
that holds the future in its hands”. In other words, “a portion of the bourgeoisie goes 
over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who 
have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical 
movement as a whole” (Marx and Engels 1955: 20).   
Lenin is in full agreement and is very clear not to romanticize the revolutionary 
potential of the working class as something that is either automatic or spontaneous.  
Indeed, while making the case for scientific socialism, he was keen to underscore the 
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theory there can be no revolutionary movement” (Lenin 1969: 25). And speaking of 
theory and its relationship to the process of scientific analysis and understanding, 
once  more  he  cites  approvingly  Karl  Kautsky,  who  argued  that  socialist 
consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge: 
 
The  vehicle  of  science  is  not  the  proletariat,  but  the  bourgeois 
intelligentsia: it was in the minds of individual members of this stratum that 
modern socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it to the more 
intellectually developed proletarians who, in their turn, introduce it into the 
proletarian  class  struggle  …  Thus,  socialist  consciousness  is  something 
introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without and not something 
that arose within it spontaneously (Lenin 1969: 40). 
 
In the Caribbean context this brings to mind the potential leadership role of 
middle class or petty-bourgeois intellectuals in a working class nationalist movement 
(Allahar 2001b). It also brings to mind Tom Nairn’s provocative charge in the 
European context that: “The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to 
invite the masses into history…” (Nairn 1977: 340). For what I want to suggest is 
that, depending on the circumstances at hand, such bourgeois or petty-bourgeois 
intellectuals may be able either to hijack the working class movement and harness its 
energies for their own purposes, or to provide genuine internationalist leadership. In 
other words, depending on the movement’s leadership and its general degree of class 
consciousness and political action, working class nationalism can be channelled in 
either a reactionary bourgeois, or a progressive socialist direction. The former, as is 
often the case, may witness the emergence of politically skilled, petty-bourgeois 
ethnic entrepreneurs, who use appeals to race and ethnic solidarity as distractions, 
and who also exploit false consciousness by tapping into the emotions of the workers 
and commanding their allegiance. The latter, on the other hand, will look beyond 
race and ethnic differences and attempt to retain its class character. This will speak to 
true class consciousness and the attempts by both the leadership and the rank and file 
of the movement to promote a socialist alternative to dependent capitalism and to 
create possibilities for the triumph of humanism and communalism over materialism, 
consumerism and individualism. 
To elaborate, as an example of the first (false consciousness) I want to suggest 
a critical look at the politics of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism and the ethnic 
entrepreneurs who energize such politics. For it is my contention that the politics in 
question serve to promote false consciousness. My point of departure is a comment 
made  by  Paul  Gilroy  and  directed  specifically  at  Afrocentrism,  but  is  equally 
applicable to other forms of ethno-national political appeals and movements. First, 
as Gilroy writes, such (Afrocentric) political movements lack “even the possibility of 
imagining an alternative to capitalism” (Gilroy 2000: 210), thus tying their fate to the 23  Politics    35 
fortunes of capital, and second, their spokespersons are responsible for promoting a 
politics  of  distraction  (race)  within  the  working  classes.  Stated  differently,  my 
charge is that ethnic nationalism is a political appeal made by ethnic entrepreneurs 
who have very clear and narrow class and power interests at heart, but who, in order 
to realise those interests, will mask them by emotional appeals to race, hoping thus to 
gain the support of as broad a base as possible. To secure their goal of mobilizing 
politically and emotionally a given population, such ethnic entrepreneurs play on an 
assumed  primordial,  ethno-racial  commonality,  which  distracts  members  of  the 
target population from a class understanding of their situation. In the process the 
latter are prevented from coming to see that the so-called harmony of ethno-racial 
interests may well mask serious class divisions within the ethno-racial group in 
question.   
On the other hand, for my example of genuine working class consciousness 
and proletarian internationalism, I refer the reader to socialist Cuba, complete with 
all its notable triumphs and glaring failures. I would also invite the reader here to 
separate  the  genuine  problems  of  socialism  in  Cuba  from  those  problems  of 
socialism induced by imperialist aggression (Allahar 2001a). Because human beings 
are imperfect (that’s what makes them human), the social and political systems they 
create will reflect those imperfections. The challenge, then, is to establish priorities 
based  on  humanistic  ideals,  to  assess  the  potential  costs  or  consequences  of 
achieving those ideals, and to strive to minimise the latter. To this I suggest that the 
imperfections of socialism are to be preferred over those of (dependent) capitalism in 
the Caribbean and elsewhere. 
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